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Abstract
EWIS has been playing more and more important role in the aircraft systems. The wiring safety becomes an urgent 
question that authorities and industry have to address. This paper studies a series of the factors contributing to the 
wiring failures and gives an impact analysis for each factor in terms of the expert judgment experiment in order to 
help advance the understanding of failure mechanism in wiring and improve wiring risk assessment.
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1. Introduction
In 1996, Trans World Airlines flight exploded, with arcing in the fuel tank cited as the primary reason
for this catastrophe [1].
In 1998, Swiss Airlines flight crashed into Atlantic Ocean, with arcing in the cabin as the most 
probable reason for the catastrophe.
Fatal accidents attributed to electrical wiring and interconnect systems (EWIS) failure over the last 
few decades have drawn increased concern from industry and government bodies.
FAA has changed the airworthiness regulations to add the requirements for EWIS, of which, wire is a 
major component. On the other hand, the models used for aircraft wiring risk assessment have become a 
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major area of research and development for a variety of industries ranging from aerospace to test 
equipment manufacturers.
In order to help advance the understanding of failure mechanism in wiring and improve wiring risk 
assessment models, this article determines a series of the factors contributing to the aircraft wiring failure 
and gives an impact analysis for each factor in terms of the expert judgment experiment.
This paper includes three parts. First part introduces the background of the researches on EWIS. 
Second part puts forward a series of the factors contributing to the aircraft wiring failures and gives an 
impact analysis for each factor in terms of the expert judgment experiment. The third part concludes the 
achievement of the article.
2. The Expert Judgment Experiment
Wire reliability is dependent on the inherent properties of the wire itself, properties of the bundle of 
wires in which it is routed, and the zonal environment in which the wire is located. The number of 
different environments produced by different combinations of wire properties and zonal environments 
that realistically occur on aircraft is overwhelming.[2] In additional, historical wire failure data is sparse
currently. Therefore, it’s impossible to have a good understanding of aircraft wiring failure by usual 
statistical techniques.
The expert judgment experiment is carried out in order to determine the factors contributing to the 
aircraft wiring failures and give an impact analysis for each factor.
2.1. Assumption for the experiment
• Wire Installations are assumed to have been done adhering to best practices such as found in 
AS50881A[4]. This means that the wires are installed by competent personnel with accepted procedures.
• Connectors, while important, are not subjected in this paper.
• There are two modes of failure considered in this paper:
-Opens: This refers to a breakdown of the conductor such that the wire cannot perform its intended 
function.
-Shorts: This refers to a breakdown of the insulation and a shorting of the conductor, either to the 
structure or to another wire. 
This paper deals with the initial failure of the wire only, not discuss the case that either of these failure 
modes develops further into arcing and fire failures.
2.2. Selection of the factors contributing to failures
Wire reliability is dependent on the inherent properties of the wire itself, properties of the bundle 
of wires in which it’s routed, and the zonal environment in which the wire is located. According to 
the DO-160F[3], thirteen factors contributing to the aircraft wiring failure are selected, including wire 
gauge, conductor type, insulation type, splices, bundle size, bundle protection, curvature of bundle, 
bundle orientation, ops/main traffic, Ops temp/Alt, vibration, exposure to corrosive fluid, and 
exposure to conductive fluid.
2.3. The expert judgment experiment
The 14 experts are selected from engineers from aircraft design offices and manufactures, engineers 
from wire manufactures, engineers from airline maintenance department, professors from university.
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Initially, the experts were given an introduction of how the wiring environment and the factor
breakpoints were determined. 
The experts were asked to fill out survey questions of the form presented in Fig.1 for each failure type 
and each factor, the expert was given a base value and asked by what ratio the environment would 
become more or less severe as a single factor value was shifted. That is, using Fig.1, for example, and 
considering the factor curvature of bundle. If the current curvature value is specified as low (>10x), what 
factor (1–10) of increase (or decrease) in risk of failure would occur if this value is changed to High 
(<=10x).
Fig. 1 example survey for determining the values for the factors
2.4. The results of the experiment
• Wire gauge
Wire gauge is the measure of the cross-section area of the wire. Fig. 2 shows the comparative values of 
cross-section area for each wire gauge. Fig.3 shows the expert judgment results for the factor “wire 
gauge”.
Fig .2 comparative values of cross-section area for each wire gauge.
         
Fig.3 open/shorting  failures relative to wire gauge
As shown in the result, the more the wire gauge value is, the more easily the wire is open or short.
Many of the larger diameter wires have a thicker insulation than the smaller diameter wire. This can be 
considered when evaluating wire gauge as a factor.  
• Conductor Type
The conductor type refers to the materials type in power feeder cables and not to general-purpose wire. 
The materials are often Copper and High Strength Copper Alloy in the experiment. They have the 
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different capability of conductivity, different structure strength, and different contributions to the wiring 
failures.
        
Fig.4 open/shorting  failures relative to conductive type
If the conductor type is High Streng Copper Alloy, the wire is easier to the shorting failures, but it can 
protect the wire from the open failures. For the purposes of this paper the different plating (i.e. Tin, Silver 
or Nickel) on the wires are not considered.
• Insulation Type
The insulation materials may be the Hybrid (PI/FP composite) and XLETFE in the experiment.
     
Fig.5 open/shorting  failures relative to insulation type
The open failure rate of XLETFE wire is higher than that of Hybrid. As to the shorting failures, there 
are not significantly different between two materials.
• Splices
There are three cases for splices in the experiment:
None: There are no wire splices.
Environmental: There is an environmental (sealed) wire splice.
Non-environmental: There is a non-environmental (sealed) wire splice.
     
Fig.6 open/shorting  failures relative to splices
Majority of the experts assume that non-environmental one will make the most contribution to the 
open or short failures among the three cases.
• Bundle Size
There are four breakdowns as following in the experiment:
Large (>1.25 in): The Bundle Diameter is greater than 1.25 inches
Moderate (0.5-1.25 in): The Bundle Diameter is between 0.5 and 1.25 inches
Small (0.2-0.5 in): The Bundle Diameter is between 0.2 and 0.5 inches
Very Small (<0.2 in): The Bundle Diameter is less than 0.2 inches
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Fig.7 open/shorting  failures relative to bundle size
As shown in the results, majority of the experts assume that the smaller the bundle size is, the more 
frequently open or short failures occur.
• Bundle Protection
There are three breakpoints for the bundle protection in the experiment:
Some Level of Protection: There is some type of chafing protection on the bundle;
Not protected: There is no chafing protection on the bundle.
Protected Metal Conduit: there is a metal conduit to protect the bundle.
      
Fig.8 open/shorting  failures relative to bundle protection
As shown in the results, majority of the experts assume that if the bundle isn’t protected, the number of 
failures (including opens and shorts) will be significantly increased.
• Curvature of the wire
There are two breakpoints for curvature of the wire in the experiment.
Low (> 10x): The radius of curvature is greater than 10 times the diameter of the bundle.
High (<= 10x): The radius of curvature is less than or equal to 10 times the diameter of the bundle.
   
Fig.9 open/shorting  failures relative to curvature of bundle
• Bundle Orientation
There are two breakpoints for the bundle orientation in the experiment:
Horizontal Wire: Parallel to the roll axis or pitch axis.
Vertical Wire: Parallel to the yaw axis.
    
Fig.10 open/shorting  failures relative to bundle orientation
As shown in the results, majority of the experts assume that vertical bundle have the higher failure 
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rates for shorts and opens.
• Operation/Maintenance Traffic
There are three breakpoints in the experiment:
Low: Wire that rarely comes in contact with human either during operation or maintenance.
Moderate: Wire that rarely comes in contact with human either occasional maintenance actions.
High: Areas of high operations and maintenance traffic
  
Fig.11 open/shorting  failures relative to Ops/Main traffic
As shown in the results, majority of the experts assume that the higher the Ops/Main Traffic  is, the 
more frequently open or short failures occur.
• Operational Temperature and Altitude
There are three breakpoints in the experiment:
Benign (P & T Controlled): Pressure and Temperature are controlled
D1 (P & T not controlled): Pressure and Temperature are not controlled
D2 (High T & Strong P, both not control): The temperature is high and Pressure is strong, and 
both are not controlled
  
Fig.12 open/shorting  failures relative to Ops Temp/Alt
As shown in the results, majority of the experts assume that open or short failures occur most 
frequently in the D2 environment.
• Vibration
These break point descriptors are taken from RTCA DO-160F.
Low: (Fuselage): Vibration levels are low similar to what may be expected in the fuselage
Moderate: (Inst Panel): Vibration levels are moderate similar to what may be expected in an instrument 
panel.
High: (Nacelle etc.): Vibration levels are high similar to what may be expected in a nacelle.
Extreme: (Engine): Vibration levels are extreme similar to what may be expected near an engine.
    
Fig.13 open/shorting  failures relative to vibration
As shown in the results, that majority of the experts assume that the higher the vibration is, the more 
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frequently open or short failures occur.
• Exposure to Corrosive Fluids
Yes: The wire is routinely exposed to fluids that are corrosive.
No: The wire is not exposed to fluids that are corrosive.
   
Fig.14 open/shorting  failures relative to corrosive fluid
As shown in the results, majority of the experts assume that open or short failures occur more 
frequently while exposing to the corrosive fluids.
• Exposure to Conductive fluids
Yes: The wire is routinely exposed to fluids that are conductive.
No: The wire is not exposed to fluids that are conductive.
    
Fig.15 open/shorting  failures relative to conductive fluid
As shown in the results, majority of the experts assume that open or short failures occur more 
frequently while exposing to the conductive fluids.
3. Conclusion
EWIS has been playing more and more important role in the aircraft systems. The wiring safety 
becomes an urgent question that authorities and industry has now had to address. This paper put forward a 
series of the factors contributing to the wiring failures, including wire gauge, conductor type, insulation 
type, splices, bundle size, bundle protection, bundle orientation, curvature of bundle, ops/main traffic, ops 
temp/alt, vibration, exposure to corrosive fluid, and exposure to conductive fluid. In additional, impact 
analysis for each factor is given in terms of the expert judgment experiment.
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